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In May 2004 Malta joins the European Union. In the attainment of this goal
Malta has experienced the most dramatic passage to membership. In July
1990 it applied for membership; in 1996 it suspended the application, only
to revive it in 1998. It caught up with the other candidate countries to be the
first to hold a referendum on membership, obtaining a positive result despite
the extreme polarization of Maltese society over the issue. Indeed it was the
first among the candidate countries to ratify the Accession Treaty. With one
of the highest participation rates in politics in the world, characterized by
competition between two political parties of more or less equal strength (the
governing Nationalist Party – NP – and the opposition Malta Labour Party
– MLP), an important issue such as EU membership was bound to become
highly charged. On average 96 per cent of eligible voters participate in
Maltese general elections, which are normally held every five years. All
political issues tend to be intensely debated in the Maltese ‘polis’ and the
electorate is a highly mobilized one by most standards. Undeniably, since
1987 the EU membership issue has dominated the Maltese political debate
as few other issues have done before. Commentators have compared the
intensity of this debate to three other highly contentious issues which
preceded it in Malta’s post-war history: the debate on the proposal to
integrate Malta with the United Kingdom (1955–58), the independence
issue (1962–64) and the crisis over majority rule (1981–87).
EU membership was decided favourably in a referendum held on 8
March 2003 and then in a general election held on 12 April 2003. In the
referendum, 270,650 out of 297,881 (90.85 per cent) registered voters cast
their votes, of whom 52.87 per cent voted in favour of EU membership
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while 45.67 per cent voted against and 1.45 per cent invalidated their vote.
The MLP had campaigned strongly against membership and in favour of a
free trade ‘partnership’ agreement with the EU. It refused to recognize the
result and, in keeping with its long-stated position that the issue had to be
decided in a general election, voters were called to the polls again on 12
April. This time a majority of just below 52 per cent voted to return the
incumbent NP to government. The NP had unequivocally favoured Malta’s
EU membership since 1979. Just a couple of days after the publication of
the general election result and after taking the oath of office, Malta’s prime
minister Eddie Fenech Adami went to Athens on 16 April to sign the treaty
of accession.
The signing of the Athens agreement signified the closure of one chapter
in Malta’s recent political history and the opening of a new one. The focus
shifted to the Labour Party. Following a brief leadership ‘crisis’ that saw the
unexpected reconfirmation of the party’s incumbent leader Alfred Sant, the
party began a painful internal debate on its EU policy. The signs of change
came in quick succession. Immediately after the election, a couple of freshly
re-elected Labour members of parliament declared that EU membership
was no longer an issue. Then in an interview to the Malta Independent on
Sunday of 1 June 2003, Sant said: ‘What we believe about EU accession is
now immaterial. The thing has been decided and we face a new reality now.
This is not a question of changing our minds but of accepting reality.’ Since
the MLP had constantly argued that membership should be decided by a
general election, the party was able to justify its change of policy on the
grounds that it was bowing to the democratic will of the majority.
Comparisons with the UK Labour Party and the Greek Socialist Party
PASOK were also made in defence of this turnaround. However, it was also
true that while both the UK Labour Party and PASOK had taken more time
to change their positions on the EU, Maltese Labourites were being asked
to make the change in just a few months. This was largely dictated by the
need to prepare the party for the European Parliament elections due in June
2004.
This change of policy by the MLP was helped by the existence of a
sizeable minority in favour of EU membership within the party. This silent
faction had for many years been a reluctant passenger in the party’s intense
anti-EU membership crusade. In the post-election phase, it was somewhat
hamstrung by the reconfirmation of Sant as party leader, whom many
blamed for the referendum and election debacle. Indeed, a change of party
leader would have facilitated the party’s change of direction on the EU. On
the other hand, Sant’s new pragmatism on the EU was opposed by Karmenu
Mifsud Bonnici, a former prime minister and leader of the MLP, and
founder of the Campaign for National Independence (CNI) established soon
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after the commencement of the membership negotiations with the EU, to
campaign against membership. Mifsud Bonnici later abandoned CNI to join
Dom Mintoff, another former leader of the MLP and twice prime minister
(1955–58, 1971–85), at the head of a new organization, the Front Maltin
Inqumu (Maltese Arise Front). Mintoff had caused a furore in 1998 when he
brought down the Labour government of Sant by voting against it in a vote
of confidence in the House of Representatives. That vote led to an early
election that saw the Nationalist Party returned to government with a
comfortable five-seat majority, ironically opening the way to the resumption
of membership negotiations with the EU. 
The MLP called a general conference to be convened between 7 and 9
November to discuss and approve a motion, which amongst other things
called on the party to accept EU membership. At the same time it started
mending its fences with the Party of European Socialists (PES) from whom
it had strayed. The internal ‘No’ faction headed by Mifsud Bonnici
presented a different motion urging the party to remain consistent with its
pre-election anti-EU policy and to ‘work incessantly’ to change the EU
membership agreement, a euphemism for negotiating Malta’s exit from the
Union at the first available opportunity. The two motions were to be voted
on separately, raising the ominous prospect that both would be approved by
the party delegates in a bid to maintain unity despite their mutual
exclusiveness. In a last minute compromise, Mifsud Bonnici withdrew his
motion in return for an addition to the wording of the motion calling on the
party: 
in opposition and in government to do its utmost with all means and
within the realm of the possibilities available, to counter all the
negative effects that could result from the membership agreement
reached by the Nationalist Government and to see that this agreement
is not disadvantageous to the Maltese people…1
Mifsud Bonnici’s original amendment, which he later withdrew, had made
no reference to ‘countering the negative effects’ but more specifically to
‘changing the membership package’, spelling the danger that Labour’s dual
personality on Europe could linger on for some time into the future,
notwithstanding the impression that the matter had been closed for good by
the conference. When the amended motion was put to the vote, 647
delegates voted for it, 17 voted against, two votes were invalidated and two
delegates abstained. Thus a staggering 96.9 per cent of the party delegates
approved the change of policy. However, it is necessary to point out that in
the election of the party officials a couple of days earlier, no fewer than 871
votes were cast, indicating that 203 voters stayed away from the crucial vote
on the EU motion.
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Apart from finally deciding Malta’s EU fate and changing the MLP’s
stance on the EU, the 2003 referendum and general election were significant
for a few additional reasons. First, they confirmed that, as successive
opinion polls had indicated in the years before the referendum, the Maltese
electorate was closely divided over membership. The same surveys had
constantly shown that those in favour of membership had a slight advantage
over those against. All this was in line with past historical experience: in all
the general elections since 1966, all dominated by the MLP–NP ‘duopoly’,
the party winning the election normally secured slightly less than 52 per
cent of the valid votes cast. Significantly also, during the campaign some
speculators argued that a substantive part of the electorate might be ready to
ditch the Nationalist Party in the election given that it had been in
government for all the years since 1987 except for a brief 22-month period
in 1996–98. This of course did not materialize and might be indicative of
the solidity of the pro-EU constituency in Malta, which the MLP may have
overlooked. Indeed, in an opinion poll carried out on behalf of the Sunday
Times of Malta (the biggest circulation newspaper in the country) and
published on 1 June 2003, 81.3 per cent of respondents wanted the MLP to
embrace EU membership. This also indicated that support for EU
membership runs deeper than the election and referendum results show and
cuts much deeper across party lines. Also, many who voted ‘No’ in the
referendum and for the MLP in the election may have done so more out of
loyalty to the party than out of conviction concerning its EU membership
policy. Lastly, 2003 saw Malta transformed from a deeply polarized country
regarding EU membership, to one where support for membership is very
similar to that encountered in other southern European countries.
In addition, the MLP’s decision to follow in the footsteps of its Greek and
UK counterparts, by changing its policy on Europe, has not only
strengthened Maltese support for EU membership but also changed the
competitive nature of Maltese politics. Officially the curtain was brought
down on the MLP’s anti-EU stance on 14 November, when the PES
unanimously accepted the MLP as a full member.
The Position of the Governing Nationalist Party
The NP’s pro-EU stance often confounds those political observers who are
unfamiliar with Maltese politics. How can nationalism and European
integration be reconciled? One plausible explanation is that Maltese
nationalism has been historically defined by the necessity of acquiring
independence and statehood, while encouraging Malta’s efforts to join the
European mainstream. In 1962 Malta under a Nationalist government
requested independence from the UK. But since the UK had already asked
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to join the EEC, it became clear that given its economic dependence on the
UK, it was important for Malta to conclude some form of trade arrangement
with the Community in the event that the UK joined it. In subsequent years
this position was refined further; on his way to a conference of
Commonwealth prime ministers convened in London in September 1962 to
discuss the UK’s EEC membership, Malta’s prime minister expressed this
change quite succinctly: 
We have expressed our wish that Malta joins the European
Community, though we still do not have a formal application. We
believe that eventually, Malta will join the Community, both in the
event of the UK’s membership and not. We too form part of Europe.
Since Malta is still not independent, it can only apply for an
Association Agreement. We are hoping to gain independence in a
short while. In that way we will be able to ask for full membership.
[However] Malta will not make a formal application before
examining the problems which the UK will face in its own
application.2
Later, the European Commission proposed an interim and sui generis
agreement for Malta, which would apply in the event that the UK joined the
Community before Malta had become independent. In 1967, three years
after independence, Malta again approached the EEC for the conclusion of
some form of agreement. This culminated in the signing of an association
agreement in 1970 envisaging the eventual establishment of a customs
union with the Community at the end of a second stage. No reference to
eventual Community membership was made in the agreement, but both
sides seemed to regard it as a preparatory stage to membership. Prime
minister Borg Olivier, in a speech on the occasion of the signing of the
agreement, said ‘We are also hopeful that in the course of time it could
develop into fuller participation in a united Europe’3 Sigismund von Braun,
permanent representative of Germany, who at the time held the presidency
of the Council, replied: 
The Community is aware of the fact, that, in seeking association with
it, Malta has made a choice which goes beyond the mere settlement of
economic matters … The Maltese Government has in fact decided on
the close participation of the country in the work of European
integration … This agreement is in fact a starting point, not an
achieved goal.4
The agreement was criticized by the MLP led by Dom Mintoff and
when it was elected to government in 1971 negotiations with the EEC led
to the broadening of its scope by means of additional protocols concluded
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in the mid-1970s, in line with the EC’s new Global Mediterranean Policy.
In 1979, in the wake of the EC’s second enlargement and just prior to the
closure of the British military bases in Malta, the NP launched its EU
membership policy. The party was only able to begin to pursue this aim
when it was elected to government in 1987. In 1990 Malta applied to join
the EU.
Main Results of Membership Negotiations
In the membership negotiations, Malta successfully employed its small size
to secure concessions that would meet the salient concerns of the Maltese
electorate, the unique characteristics of smallness as well as Malta’s
economic and political exigencies. The political divisiveness of
membership discussed above may actually have helped Malta in attaining
these goals. The main outcomes of the negotiations from a Maltese
perspective are:
• Malta did not need to abandon its neutrality, closely defined in its
Constitution. This step would have required the approval of two-thirds
of the House of Representatives. Malta made a Declaration, attached to
the Treaty of Accession (TA, OJ L 236, 23 September 2003), whereby it
affirmed its commitment to the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
while stressing that any decision to move to a common defence would
have to be taken by unanimity by the Council and that it had to be
adopted by the member states in accordance with their constitutional
requirements.
• The Maltese language, which has developed from Arabic and is spoken
by the majority of Maltese, was accepted as an official EU language. 
• Protocol No.7 attached to the TA declared: ‘Nothing in the Treaty on
European Union, or in the Treaties establishing the European
Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing
those Treaties, shall affect the application in the territory of Malta of
national legislation relating to abortion.’ In predominantly Catholic
Malta, abortion is not permitted and there is a solid anti-abortion
majority that crosses political party lines.
• Protocol No.6 allows Malta to regulate and retain certain restrictions on
the freedom of non-nationals to acquire property as a secondary
residence unless they have legally resided in Malta for a period of five
years. Malta is obliged to publish transparent and non-discriminatory
criteria to regulate the acquisition of secondary properties, but is
permitted to revise the value thresholds to reflect changes in property
prices in Malta. This measure was dictated by Malta’s restricted
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territorial size (316km2) and its high population density, which at 1,911
persons per km2 is the second highest in the world.
• Maltese citizens will enjoy complete free movement in the rest of the EU
upon accession (Article 39). Malta has however secured a seven-year
transitional arrangement in which it may call upon the Commission to
restrict within a period of two weeks the right of EU citizens to seek
employment in Malta. Malta may also take similar action unilaterally in
urgent and exceptional cases and send a reasoned ex-post notification to
the Commission. This safeguard has been negotiated given that a small
influx of workers from the EU may create serious problems in Malta’s
small labour market. A declaration by the current member states was
also attached to the TA.
• On value added tax (VAT), Malta accepted a transitional period until 1
January 2010 up to which it can maintain its zero per cent rate instead
of the standard five per cent on supplies of foodstuffs and
pharmaceuticals provided that the transitional period referred to in
Article 28(1) of the Sixth VAT Directive would expire on that day (TA;
OJL 236, Declaration 37, p.983).
• A declaration by Malta on the sister island of Gozo (population circa
35,000) notes the economic and social specificities and disadvantages of
the island, proposing measures to overcome them such as the zero-rating
of inter-island transport and transitional arrangements for the transport
of agricultural goods to Malta. The declaration goes on: 
before the end of each Community budgetary period entailing a
redefinition of the Community regional policy, Malta will request
that the Commission report to Council on the economic and social
situation of Gozo and in particular on the disparities in the social
and economic development levels between Gozo and Malta. 
The Community would be asked to adopt the necessary measures under
the regional policy or other Community instruments to reduce such
disparities.
• Malta has secured an amendment to Regulation EC 1626/94 by which it
will manage a 25 nautical mile conservation zone in which fishing effort
will be limited to small-scale coastal fishing, a measure that helps
preserve the small Maltese fishing sector, while ensuring that fish stocks
in this area are not wiped out by more aggressive fishing methods used
by fishermen from other EU states.
• On agriculture, Malta has been allowed to operate a unique Special
Market Policy Programme for Maltese Agriculture, which is a system of
temporary state aid to support agricultural producers up to a specified
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ceiling of output relevant to each sector constituting Malta’s key
agricultural products.
Conclusion
It has not been possible in the context of this Profile to provide a
comprehensive analysis of Malta’s EU membership bid and the main
implications of membership. However, it has been shown that the EU
membership issue, having split Maltese society down the middle for many
years following the application made in 1990, seems now to have been
resolved. This does not mean that the debate is closed forever; it simply
means that one chapter has been closed and another has just begun to be
written. The main characteristics of this new phase are no longer whether
Malta should join the EU or not, but about how the country will perform
within the Union. The new-found unity augurs well for the Maltese in the
EU. Yet if the political struggle and divisiveness is now going to be
transposed to another level, it may not only provide more grist to the
political scientist’s mill, but may also sap some of the scarce resources of
this small member state.
NOTES
1. http://www.mlp.org.mt/stqarrijiet/full_report.asp?ContentID=STQ031107c (19 Nov. 2003).
2. Quoted in ‘Ir-Review’, Department of Information, Malta, Sept. 1962. 
3. Ibid., p.5.
4. Malta Today, V, No.12, Dec. 1970, Department of Information, Malta, p.4.
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